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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

CIRCUIT COURTS
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(requiring analysis of whether increased storm drainage constituted a
taking of a flowage easement by inverse condemnation and holding
that property need not suffer an effectual destruction or a permanent
and exclusive occupation by government runoff for a taking claim
based on a flowage easement).
The dispute in this case arose just after the United States Postal
Service completed a new facility in mountainous West Virginia in late
1993. Due to the construction of the facility, the amount of storm
water runoff into South Hollow sharply increased. Ridge Line, Inc.
("Ridge Line") owned South Hollow. Ridge Line built a storm water
detention pond and requested contribution from the government.
The government refused to pay and Ridge Line sued in the United
States Court of Federal Claims ("claims court"), claiming that the
alleged taking entitled it to just compensation.
The claims court found that increased storm drainage caused by
the construction of the Postal Service facility and associated parking
lots and driveways did not constitute a taking of any real property
interest that justified compensation. The claims court also found that
the development of the Postal Service property caused seventy percent
of the increased runoff; however, while the water might have "invaded"
Ridge Line's property, the invasion was insufficient to constitute an
exclusive and permanent occupation. Moreover, since Ridge Line
added additional landfill to South Hollow and covered the original
storm water detention pond, insufficient evidence existed to
determine if there had been a temporary invasion of the property.
The claims court also found that Ridge Line could not prove damages
because it failed to appraise the property before and after the damage.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that
property need not suffer an effectual destruction or permanent and
exclusive occupation in order to be a taking and vacated and
remanded the decision back to the trial court.
On appeal, the court first addressed the takings issue. The court
reasoned that a permanent occupation need not exclude the property
owner or be continuous to be compensable as a taking. Furthermore,
the court concluded United States v. Dickinson established that the
government may not take an easement, or impose a flowage easement,
without just compensation. Although Ridge Line had raised a claim
for inverse condemnation of the water flowage easement and
contended that just compensation would be a proportional cost of the
building and maintenance of the flood control system, the claims
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court erred in failing to address this claim.
The court next addressed whether Ridge Line, by filling and
altering most of the area it complained the government eroded, had
suffered any loss of use of the property. Because Dickinson held that a
landowner's reclaiming his land does not disentitle him to
compensation for the original taking by the government, the claims
court was in error. The claims court also erred in finding that
damages could not be demonstrated simply because Ridge Line did
not provide appraisals of the land before and after the erosion.
Dickinson held that if the land erosion caused by a taking is
preventable, the cost of prevention is a proper basis for determining
damages.
Finally, the court identified the appropriate inverse condemnation
analysis to be used on remand. The court held that whether a
comipensable taking occurred in this case depended on whether Ridge
Line's loss may properly be analyzed under takings law as opposed to
tort law, and then on whether Ridge Line has a protected property
interest under West Virginia property law that a government actor has
infringed. For Ridge Line to establish that takings law analysis is
appropriate, the court held it must prove the taking was the direct,
natural, and probable consequence of the Postal Service development,
rather than just an incidental injury. The court also held that the
claims court must consider whether the government's interference
with any property rights of Ridge Line was substantial and frequent
enough to rise to the level of a taking. Finally, the court held that if
the claims court, on remand, determines that taking analysis is proper,
it must then address whether the steps taken by the government in
storm water retention and the amount that invaded Ridge Line's
property were reasonable under West Virginia law. Thus, because the
claims court did not address Ridge Line's inverse condemnation claim,
and therefore did not address whether takings or torts law analysis was
proper, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for further analysis
consistent with its opinion.
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SECOND CIRCUIT
No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602 (2d Cir.
2003) (holding private citizens can sue under Clean Water Act
regardless of whether the claimed violation also constituted a violation
of Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, which does not
provide for citizen enforcement of suits).
In August 1999, several residents of Queens, New York
contracted the West Nile virus, a virus transmitted by mosquitoes. In
response, New York City sprayed pesticides designed to kill the

